

Scanned by F/23471 P

OPT&T #1.

The Briefest Possible Note on the Scientificity of Definitions.

It is because I have lately talked with, and read, people with whose views I have disagreed, that I emit this paper. Had I written this sooner, as I might, I should have referred in the title to the "propriety" of definitions; but I am trying to become more ~~a~~/sociologist than philosopher, and so am trying to get the hang of words in this field.

The view I disagree with is most lucidly on paper in Zetterberg, "On Theory and Verification in Sociology." Let me call it the "axiological approach." My own ~~view~~^{outlook} might be called the "analytic-tiptoe" approach. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~^{outlook}, (Others, and "audio-visualism," the "empirico-sneaky" method, I hope to discuss in a future possible brief note.) Any ~~similarity~~^{M.} here to the views of Dr./Scriven may be ^{usefully} conceptualized as non-accidental.

The axiological approach is as follows: that the best way to make Sociology scientific/^{method of} is to introduce the/postulate and deduction, which we are so familiar with from Euclid and Clark L. Hull. ~~The~~ A theory should be dehydrated to its most concise possible form, a set of incisive statements; these should be labeled "definitions" and "axioms" and ~~unsubstantiated~~ the rest of the theory deduced as postulators.

In this way

But this ~~ix~~ description may not be terribly elegant nor terribly precise, and so we may be led to attempt a further step-- choosing ~~ix~~ certain characteristics as definitional, as being critical, fundamental, basic, perhaps necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the word "camel" to a thing. The biologists seem to have done just this, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ in fact; a dictionary is likely to tell us, ^{just by emphasis} that its ~~family~~ hereditary family is ~~ix~~ what makes a camel a camel, and even Antarctic camels with ~~ix~~ black hair and long beards would still be camels if we could prove their descent.

....

If you like circles and dots, as I do,.... "the circles that seem to have the most generality" are the useful ones. In other words, all objects that ____ seem also to have _____. We have now one circle full of dots and two descriptions of it. Which is "defining"? Why that one which fits in with the most other things.

.....

We would really have no use at all for $\frac{\sum (\bar{X} - x_i)^2}{n}$ were it not for the statistical properties which this number has.

....

We will choose some things as "defining" for their elegance and basicness; if they are simpler, or have been important and are hence more general, we may want to make them defining.

....

... CORRESPONDING EXTENSIONAL CLY TO
 ANOTHER CATE GRY, THAT WH/CH...
 (Give example, for Gossake.)

(INSERT IN OP RSP I)

Of course

If the alternatives have been really arranged according to some principle, then searching for a principle becomes a guessing game, like science itself. Unless we want a simpler recognition-principle.

THAT'S WHAT

OP. RESEARCH

~~BUT IT~~ INVOLVES

QUESTIONS & SUMMARIES OF PRINCIPLE,

~~THOUGHT~~.

(finds in examples)

In the sense that it is still
difficult, I think the mind-body
problem is ~~still~~ ^{as} I found it.

~~but in my own thinking it is now~~

The Richard 'we-don't-need-minds' behaviorist
can still make a ~~good~~ court case
and a party? splash. But insofar as
we do ^{assume} {calculate as though other people
have minds ~~and feelings~~ ^{and feelings} of great complexity, and

~~really thought that~~
~~over~~ These calculations

are ^{pragmatically} borne out in splendid detail throughout
every moment of our lives such a viewpoint
seems to a sophisticated social science ~~more of a~~ ^{less} ~~viewpoint~~ ^{viewpoint} ~~than~~ ^{than} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~science~~ ^{science}

than of sci.

[Essay The first.]

ON MAKING A LIST OF THE THINGS YOU WANT.

Suppose you are a brain-trust organization seeking to inform the government of the relative preferability of different outcomes of an atomic war; an old cook telling the new one what the fickle family/likes; a Committee for National Goals, ~~unwillingly pointing the way for~~ ^{deciding} what the country should ~~do~~ ^{attempt} in the future.

In each of these cases, you ~~will~~ ^{might} be doing something roughly like this: you will be seeking general principles to describe an ordering of alternatives, some of which are desired or enjoyed or feared more; some, less.

These cases differ from the stock economic situation in that there is no common currency for which they can all be bought; ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ we are not allocating resources or deciding to switch one alternative for another. These possible trades are the subject of price theory,

~~xxxxxx~~ ~~Rather~~ usually and/involve exchange values-- either ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ supplied by the ~~a~~ individual, in which case the ordering we discuss would be a possible first step,

or external, which is ~~xxxxxxxx~~ general economics.

~~In this ordering process, one may proceed in two directions;~~

~~Require prices as well as external difference-rates~~

~~Can go either direction~~

In these cases, one seeks principles

~~or better; that is, one may seek principles~~

~~that summarize or digest an ordering of possible~~

~~events or world-states that is already clear to~~

Another process of interest is its opposite, applying
~~himself or he may apply principles to cases to find out what~~

~~particular order of world things corresponds to a~~

There is an interesting logical relation between these.
~~set of principles already in mind. The former might~~

~~be called~~

~~an extensional method (from extension to~~ intension.)
~~going by precedent. (A~~ child

~~and lime-flavored things better than chocolate or strawberry,~~

~~hence concludes he likes green things better than red or~~

~~brown things.) The latter method might be called "intensional,"~~

(or, casuistical,)
~~proceeding from principles to cases ("I'm sure I don't~~

~~like foreign things; therefore I won't like candied chestnuts.")~~

~~Usually in such preference orderings proceed in both~~

~~directions, and there can be many reasons for it. The evolution~~

~~of common-law is perhaps~~

~~the best example: a judicial decision is repeated because~~

~~it seems to be like another, and there is no pressing difference;~~

~~a general principle is gradually hammered out.~~

It may be observed that in our everyday evaluations we usually proceed in both directions. In choosing what ~~xxxx~~ photographs they will use in a picture-story, magazine-editors may look at the pictures first, then devise principles ~~of organization~~ which lead them to prefer one photograph over another ("Let's ~~xxx~~ give it the glamour slant-- that means the fur-rug shot is better than the one where she's typing...") -- however, looking at certain other photographs may alter the principles ("Say, let's make it glamour-with-intellect.")

A slightly different case is that in which the ordering of cases on which the principles are based is altered by the intensionalization (perhaps because such an intensionalization is simpler or easier to administer.) For instance: "Always ~~buy the dark ones~~ buy the darker firm ones, and if you can't get big ones get little, don't buy the in-between ... actually there are exceptions but this rule is a good guide."

~~These principles~~ Ordering principles which are intensionalized preference- from a given/order of things are ~~interestingly~~ subject to difficulties of "validity." Like psychological tests, they may be ~~fixing the~~ ranking the things in a way that holds for other the cases given but not for/possible ones. (For instance, ~~advertising writers output~~ ranking ~~professors by publication quantity~~ rather than standing in the profession. Our little boy who prefers to eat

green things, for instance, might find on discovering Paris green that ~~the~~ ^{his attempted} intensionalization of the preferences he has is

unsatisfactory. (Some people always like Chinese food better than French food. For others of us this is not a field in which easy intensionalization is to be accomplished.)

~~Another~~

INSERT 'George'

~~Another aspect of intensionalization~~

~~While it may not set up more complex relationships, like preference-ratios, among the things preferred,~~ Intensionalization may break down or set up equalities. That ~~it~~ is, it may give you a decision-procedure for ^{choosing} ~~deciding~~ between alternatives on which you might otherwise have been indifferent. Contrarily, it may ~~it~~ state certain things to be of equal value-- two people's lives in a disaster, ~~xxxx/unitsxxxxxxx~~ two units of happiness. (in some Utilitarian schemes.)
we may derive
Frequently/more complex relationships-- ratio valuations, for instance, may come about. ~~xxxxx~~ For example, we ~~will~~ call a disaster killing twenty people "twice as bad" as one killing ten-- assuming none are heads of state, etc.

In Operations Research or Applied Game Theory we may seek to find the value (in other units, perhaps; i.e., ratio-value) ~~xxxxxx~~ of the loss of a million people in the next war, or a rook on your chessboard. ~~xxxxxxx~~ Tabulating on a profit-and-loss sheet, we may state that ~~xxxxxx~~ machine-operator is worth fifty thousand dollars to the company." However, these are not strictly intensionalization-~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ problems. They are related to other, ~~goals~~ further goals-- national survival, the outcome of the chess-game, corporation profit. They are

■ attempts at simplification of the complex-- as, for instance, the value of your rook depends on what else is on the board, what situation you're in, and your style of play. Because projections of this kind leave a great deal out, their accuracy is fickle.* ~~(While no one charts~~

~~flight plans for butterflies, these~~

FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE
Of course, these examples may still partake of the

principle of intensionalization: if ~~xxx~~ the evaluators, by eye or skill, ~~xxxxxxx~~ make ^a ~~xxxx~~/rankings of possible situations, and a principle is sought which will describe this well, -- for instance, a simple operating rule. However, insofar as ~~they~~ are involved with these examples theoretical considerations-- the real problems of the field-- it is something else again. (If they cheat and use a computer, that shows they probably know ~~xxx~~ something about the principles already.)

FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE

~~I have come now to ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ a stumbling block of Utilitarianism.~~

Presumably these considerations offer a stumbling-block for Utilitarianism, or any ethical system~~x~~ that speaks of quantities of things being better than other quantities of things-- for instance, that ^{for there to be} twenty units of pleasure is better than for there to be nineteen. It is hardly to be doubted

virtually
 that/everyone's list of preferences things higher of a world
 in which everyone is happy than a world in which most people
 are ~~happy~~ unhappy, other things being equal. (For those
 who regard art, knowledge, understanding of the neurotic
 process, etc., as sometimes more important than happiness
~~themselves~~
 the list of possible worlds can be ~~slightly~~
 re-ordered.) However, it is not clear that just because
 our list of preferred worlds reads thus-and-so, we can
 write ~~any~~ any decisive principle at all that successfully
 intensionalizes our beliefs completely; and it is my impression
 that that is one thing ~~that~~ an Utilitarian ethic would seek
 to do.

Find.

IMPLICIT STRATEGY
" VALUATION

P. Fack

Contract
Bellicosity

(over)

I have need to provide a reasonable account of things I have at hand explained at this trip:

EXPERIENCING IN TERMS OF
AFFECT WITHOUT INTELLIGENT
REALIZATION & SITUATION
IS LIKE A STOVE WITH
NO FOOD AND NO POT.

1) The ~~problem~~ of belligerence and threat

3) Prejudice

- a) The circumstances under which
pacifism will work (create impression)
b) how explanation and sensitivity among
people may ~~exacerbate~~ improve relations.

Of course it requires us to know why someone felt the v.

Hold out

of the SP ~~the~~
'George'

~~the~~ principles you are after may be in search

You may want to do the ~~the~~ 'best Thing,'
or you may want to understand why a Thing
is best. In either case you ~~may be~~
are searching for ~~the~~ general principles
~~behind the orderings~~

of the ranking ~~but~~; However, operating
rules and knowledge are different.

There may be a fantastically simple principle
you can assign to this ordering
(the tallest man on my list made the
most money ⁴⁰) ~~or~~ while ~~there is~~
while the causes are extremely complex
or chaotic, i.e., there ~~is~~ no general principle.

Conversely, it may be easy to understand
why a thing on our bestness - list
is where it is, but ~~no~~ there may be
no way of ~~it~~ recognizing it. It is
~~at~~ ^{merely} a question of whether ~~there is~~
there exist surface indicators for this ordering principle.
over

I have tried to trim this down to
a few examples of what I had in mind.
"The" theory of rationality will have
to wait on ~~it a little~~ more care and
more distinct focus. But I do mean to get at
a few things which I think the social-psychologists often misrepresent,
i.e., ~~these interactions like aggression & prejudice which are supposed usually to~~
~~be affect-led.~~
~~But I will talk here about:~~

~~A restatement of~~

1) Rules — a person's or
an organization's — that divide up a
lot of instances into categories.
A) the effects of the rules
B) the hierarchy " " "

2) Set-theory & the finding of

a proper in ~~view~~ statement

3) Goals [silly "definitional" mess of goals $\longleftrightarrow$ rules]

Huge Difficulties of utilitarian accounting

A) INTENSIONAL ordering of a large number of alternative universes

① ~~THE~~ ALWAYS THE PROBLEM OF, ~~THE~~ DESPITE THE INTENSION WE'VE FOUND, MAY THERE NOT BE A POSSIBLE UNIVERSE VERY MUCH AWAY FROM WHERE IT SHOULD BE RANKED?

PSYCHIC FEEDBACK.

I want to discuss some problems which tend to become obscured; those aspects of human behavior which involve ~~predicting what the other~~ judging what another person is thinking, or predicting what he will do. The name I propose is "psychic feedback;" I do not ever intend to broach this term in the literature, but

~~The reason I go out of the way to point this up as un-~~

This is importantly unusual subject-matter; and while I do not mean to be immodest, bears about the same relation to what can be described in simple S-R terms that the integers do to $\sqrt{-1}$.

In other words, something more is required here.

- I. WE JUDGE OTHER PEOPLE, IN MANY WAYS. These are subject to the criteria of truth and falsity.
1. In the first place, I think it will be agreed that straight predictions of others' actions are obviously either true or false; that is, either they are confirmed or disconfirmed when the time comes.
2. Statements about 'state of mind' are less obviously amenable to the criteria of truth and falsity. It is

clear that if they are advanced as straight dispositional or tendency-statements or conditional statements, they may be susceptible to confirmation -- at any rate, the dispositional or conditional or tendency-component of the statement may be confirmed. Thus, on the S-R view, the phenomenological component of the statements is "surplus meaning," systematically unconfirmable; yet this is the component I have been talking about.

Yet it is hard to see that the ~~statement~~ question "do you get the joke?" can fail to have a phenomenological component of which the external manifestations are actions like laughing, knee-slapping, rolling on the floor.

On the S-R view, one talks about the perceived stimulus as being really there (i.e., a red disk at the end of a maze) but not when we are talking about the perceived mental-states of others. This would seem puzzling when we are correct. If a subject says, "I see a mountain," on seeing a stereopticon slide, we judge that his statement is true if he says it when looking toward a mountain we know to be there. Same with statements about people's internal states: they may have action results in the indefinite future, but this is not their meaning.

And part of the puzzle is that they have no

And the same is true with statements like "He is happy" and "he is in love." While each of these suggests a good deal in the way of possible actions by him, none may correctly be said to be a necessary component of the meaning; though he would really be a case if these held for him no behavioral entailments.

A clue is the notion of latent muscular & neural patterns which might (under the right circumstances) become action but this is not phenomenology. Fug.

This is partly the summary-puzzle. ~~People's~~ If people's thoughts are ~~thoughts being as~~ complex as laymen usually suppose them to be, there are many different sets of ~~xxx~~ statements which would be correctly summarized as "he is ~~xxxxhappyxx~~ in love," many of which may be contradicted in other ^{such} sets.

This is related to "multiple satisfiability," the property that a lot of different world-states will ~~xxx~~ satisfy the same general statements.

So much, for now, for predictions and state-of-mind statements. Now to a third category, ~~xxxx~~ of what I believe is great importance: subtle-judgement. These are the kind of judgements~~x~~ which are neither predictions nor phenomenological statements, but partake of both. These are indeed multiply satisfiable; the statement, for instance, "George is ~~an~~ grouchy person" suggests that George will behave in unpleasant ways toward people, but does not imply it; it may also be a statement about George's st. mind.

These three categories were mentioned just to impress you with the range of possible judgements of people which may be made; and with the fact that, while their truth or falsity is no simple matter, ~~it~~they can be known to be true or false in some cases.

The next topic is psychic feedback proper. And it deals with actions which involve ~~pr~~ a prediction of what other people will do or think on the basis of our own actions.

Straight predictive feedback involves merely others' actions which will be based on ours; ^{like a chess-game;} psychic feedback is that which involves their states of mind. And I think it must be conceded

(WHY?)

that it takes place.


There are times when we base our actions not on what other people may do, but on what they merely think; while all the while these thoughts might cause them to act, (and if we are worried about the thoughts it ~~ixxx~~ may well be a. that actions have

caused our ~~x~~ worry about thoughts, b. that actions may justify our fear of thoughts.)

But it may be only thoughts, conceptually, what we fear-- ~~x~~ inferred hypothetical constructs that they may be-- and not the ancillary action-potential. Let it be noted ~~if~~ that if our judgements of ~~ix~~ others' thoughts is true, well then.

Is the statement more than a summary/^{of} a disjunction of a complex action-potential statement?

~~ixxxxxxxxx~~ I certainly think so; yet I am at a loss to prove it.



BEHAVIOR-CATEGORIES

"Legitimacy-complex"

Status

Obligation

Law & Rule

Sanctions

RESPONSIBILITY / "DESERVE"

VIRTUE / HONOR / PRUDENCE / PROFLIGACY

Conduct becoming a _____

RESPONSIBILITY / FREE WILL / INITIATIVE / NEGLIGENCE

FAIR / UNFAIR

KIND / OVERGENEROUS


BAD OR GOOD LUCK

a) that for which no recompense is provided

~~xx~~ ALSO -- a loss which might well not have taken place

xx

b) accidental windfall which won't be taken away; ~~undeserved~~
'legitimate' but not 'deserved'.



BEHAVIOR-CATEGORIES

"Legitimacy-complex"

Status

Obligation

Law & Rule

Sanctions

RESPONSIBILITY / "DESERVE"

VIRTUE / HONOR / PRUDENCE / PROFLIGACY

Conduct becoming a _____

RESPONSIBILITY / FREE WILL / INITIATIVE / NEGLIGENCE

FAIR / UNFAIR

KIND / OVERGENEROUS

BAD OR GOOD LUCK

a) that for which no recompense is provided

xx ALSO -- a loss which might well not have taken place

xx

b) accidental windfall which won't be taken away; ~~xx~~
'legitimate' but not 'deserved'.

S/R

B-C

2

RESPONSIBILITY

2 types. 1) DUTY
 2) SELF-HELP ("your own" responsibility.)

SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY (for carrying out duty)

INITIATIVE (for self help)

INCENTIVE (for either)

SANCTIONS (for failure at duty)

WINNING / LOSING

Note that 'luck' and 'initiative' are also relevant.

Where ~~two~~ two semi-equal, roughly equal contenders are in the field, or representatives of two factions, then some decision-procedure may be employed which is wholly or partly a chance device. ~~WAR~~ ~~as~~ as a decision-procedure has the special advantage of being self-enforcing ~~as a decision-procedure~~ (in the case of pure victory.)

RIGHTS / PRIVILEGES

RIGHTS / RESPONSIBILITIES


The notion of 'free will' is compounded by its various definitional-type attributes: its derivation from other categories ~~in~~ (causation, initiative...) or certain things that usually fall within it-- sensation of free choice, for example, which contrasts with idea of being forced, predetermined.

Welf-Complex

WILL → EFFORT, DISCOMFORT, SACRIFICE, ...

[S] [E]

- a) challenge/threat → consolidation
- b) gifts, thanks, apologies, ^{favours} → filling
categories + giving impressions
- c) scheduled reprisals
- d) scheduled gifts; got/etch.
- e) AS THESE GIVE IMPRESSIONS OF
INNER STATES OF MIND AND
PROPENSITIES; the multi-feedback
judging of them on this basis.
- f) drawing the line
→ CONVINCING OF OUR SINCERITY



1

Intensionality & Extensionality.

1. Their relation: rules & instances.

A. Decision-procedure

B. Lines of least resistance.

2. How an individual may acquire a role-system -
(~~starting~~ with either.)

3. 'Purposes' of rules.

4. ~~General~~ Effect.

A. general

B. specific - laws to prevent.

2. ^{ANOTHER 'PURPOSE' WHICH MUST EXIST IN THE LONG RUN IF WE MEDITATE} Squaring with a system: hierarchy;
spheres of influence; contradictions
& their resolution, either by ~~squaring the~~ re-cutting spheres of influence, reinterpreting, or throwing out the contradictory one.

The nature of a test case:

to clarify the borderlines -
but may upset everything,
break an equilibrium,
change whole setup.

4. 'Cultural' transmission of a value-system.

- extensional
 Φ individual squares it himself
- intensional
 Φ " applies " "
- both; mixture.

REGARDLESS OF HOW CAREFULLY HE MAY BE TAUGHT,
 OUTSIDE INFLUENCES OR OWN THOUGHTS MAY
 JAR THE FRAMEWORK. FOR A SYSTEM TO BE
 TRANSMITTED INTACT, THEN, WE MAY PRESUME THAT
 SOME COMMUNITY OF UNANIMITY IS DESIRABLE.

5. ~~Three~~ interesting fields of human categorization.

- A. The complexes of initiative, responsibility, volition,
 determination.
- B. The judging of things like 'eligible,' 'suitable,' by
 criteria.
 a) as invested rules
 ~~b) as personally set~~
 b) as personal rules (highly-structured individual)
 c) ~~as~~ without rules (totally non-structured [mythical] ind.)
- C. The 'Hone' model.

DERIVED CATEGORIES AND BEHAVIOR.

- People's actions may be oriented in terms of derived categories.
- There exists a number of categories, derivationally related, which are culturally universal.
- An individual some of whose behavior is oriented to such categories may put the emphasis on one or the other of such categories, and/or the boundaries among them, or certain of these boundaries; AND BEHAVE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO WHAT HE EMPHASIZES.
- BOUNDARIES AMONG THEM may be the more or less
 - A) logically explicit (defined in terms of the other categories' differentia ~~xxx~~ plus logical terms,) B) intricate, careful (re the things which are in and out-- extensional definition,) C) coherent in a world-view, some or all of whose parts fit together carefully.
- AN individual may proceed in his formulation either extensionally or syntactically -- in the first case from a set of examples ~~xxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxxx~~ known to be in a certain set of categories, in the latter according to the relations he ~~xxxxxxxx~~ believes are important among them-- and formulating a more precise world-view in either way.
N.B. we all do both.

PHILOSOPHY OF PRICING

One thought on the ascription of equal value to equal units.

Send this to Scriv
Beard
Pierson

In a money economy, everything has a value, so it would seem
superfluous to go around figuring how we put values on things

.....
certain equality principles, for expectancy and fairness, plus
implicit decision to abide by market...

.....
We have swung a long circle, ending at money, but cutting our meat
from easier examples of moral and game theory...

The following is really four or five different things.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCOUNTING -- another aspect.

Suppose you have a single continuum of goodness.

STILL* you must put in other continua of more proximate goodness,
since the single scale may not be more readily attainable, and other
intermediate scales must be put in.

/ Sort of 'working rules' whereby you expect the one
/ type of thing to be better to do for your final-good
/ continua.

ANYHOW plotting all things onto a single rating is spurious (sic)
since it omits conditionalities.

PLOTTING CONDITIONAL RATINGS ONTO A SINGLE ONE IS TREACHEROUS.

They might change in their utilities, payoffs, etc.

The importance of this fact varies with a lot of things.

*Except for pursuit-curve, 'next-moment-from-previous' situations.

Plotting payoffs on a single scale-- worse or better depending
on how ~~x~~ conditional the sub-payoffs are for your final goodness
-- is very like finding appropriate variables for summary description
How conditional are they? The more so, the less will their single
scale tell you.

AmwHwM

Any

~~Only~~ argument that each unit of good is of equal utility is either
 a) the averaging process we have just (?) described, or b) according
 to some production-possibility curve, in which case it's the same
 but to justify the outcome as equivalent.

My analysis of that pricing-problem

Holds for 'pleasure' & 'American cities destroyed,' but not for

individuals-- because ~~of categoricity owing to attitude problem.~~

~~(HUMS)~~ the attitude-problem makes calculations impossible.

Whether two continua may be plotted onto one depends on how conditional
 they are; or how conditional you will 'allow' them to be.

People have sort of rules they go by about their utilities, but (thank
 goodness for their sakes) these are frequently modified ad hoc.
 In other words, their own general formulations of what they want may be
 good statements of roughly what to be after in the general run of
 situations (or 'the way it looks from here,') but these rules aren't
 as general as they might think: I.E. UTILITY-FUNCTION (real) much more
 COMPLICATED.

Continua of payoff vs. conditional payoff.

EXAMPLE.

Choice of college: 'academic goodness' -- 'general' vs. 'by departments'
 or ~~xxx~~ 'by individual man.'

CONVERTING THE PRINCIPLES HOWBY WE WILL SQUARE THE SET OF PAYOFFS.

Let us say that there is a limited number of criteria-- for example,
 two-- of which our payoff-number (assigned directly, by formula)
 is a function.

ANY decision-procedure (in the case of equal-pairs, for deciding which
 is better) and any conditionals-- 'outside,' i.e., irrelevant to
 the criteria we have set or in some way circumstantial to them-- or
 inside criteria, some ~~x~~ other measurable attribute-- must also be
 counted as really being another criterion.

WAIT A MINUTE-- a chance decision-procedure is not a criterion; rather,
 it's a mechanism. And arbitrary, impulsive decisions can't be called
 criterial either. PERHAPS THESE REALLY CONFORM TO REGULARITIES AND
 ARE THUS CRITERIA, BUT that's rather like introducing some very
 complicated formula where it doesn't have to be explicitly stated;
 explaining somebody's lateness in terms of a subway-router's indi-
 gestion.

SCHEDULING PAYOFFS IN A SERIAL ORDER is like / relates to scheduling

Payoff-listing is different from pricing.

NELSON'S CONJECTURE.

Principles of payoff ranking apply to the goodness of barter & economic systems only as far as the alternative systems (in their totality) are concerned-- i.e., ranking of all the goodies in the society, inc. especially 'rule' ones-- equity, hierarchy stuff.

'Another day, another dollar.' But we might earn that dollar the last minute, or the first. But these are all 'unreal allocations'-- with imaginative value and not much more.

To put it much better: trying to put too fine a point on 'paper allocations' (day : dollar) shows a misunderstanding of the terms if it is not familiar with the way the allocation is made: the dollar is not given for the last minute's work on condition that the preceding part of the day be worked also; while this is indistinguishable from 'dollar is for the whole day' operationally under certain circumstances we might be able to find out which the principle is. Lacking these circumstances, it seems at the very least metaphorical to suppose the dollar is for the last minute's work.

ANYHOW

THE GENERAL

OVERWEENING


OVERRIDING PRINCIPLE. ~~establishing a ranking~~

There are two ways of ~~getting a ranking~~ of values along a continuum. EXTENSIONAL-- order the possible universes on a scale of their goodness to you; then choose/among the possible/reasonable principles ~~by~~ if you wish

that will yield this ranking. N.B.: 1) there may be a number of possible sets of principles for you to choose among; 2) you may be unable to find a consistent set.


INTENSIONAL-- starting with the rules and projecting them onto the field,

Small bollix: the differences of individual judgement ~~will~~ may crop up in either case. In the extensional, even people who generally agree on things may disagree on precise order despite broad similarities of outlook. In the intensional, ~~people~~ people may disagree on the application of the rules (subject, then, to all the 'schematics' complaints,) ~~and~~ or they may through myopia etc. merely misjudge upon scales where there exists basic agreement.



→ & All the problems of
EXPECTATION
DECLARATION, COMMITMENT

→ + A



lit
9/10
↓
Cook

Wash
4/10/10



Psychic
Feedback

OPT&T #1.

The Briefest Possible Note on the Scientificity of Definitions.

It is because I have lately talked with, and read, people with whose views I have disagreed, that I emit this paper. Had I written this sooner, as I might, I should have referred in the title to the "propriety" of definitions; but I am trying to become more ~~a~~/sociologist than philosopher, and so am trying to get the hang of words in this field.

The view I disagree with is most lucidly on paper in Zetterberg, "On Theory and Verification in Sociology." Let me call it the "axiological approach." My own ~~view~~^{outlook} might be called the "analytic-tiptoe" approach. ~~xxxxxx~~^{outlook}, (Others, and "audio-visualism," the "empirico-sneaky" method, I hope to discuss in a future possible brief note.) Any ~~similarity~~^{M.} here to the views of Dr./Scriven may be ^{usefully} conceptualized as non-accidental.

The axiological approach is as follows: that the best way to make Sociology scientific/^{method of} is to introduce the/postulate and deduction, which we are so familiar with from Euclid and Clark L. Hull. ~~The~~ A theory should be dehydrated to its most concise possible form, a set of incisive statements; these should be labeled "definitions" and "axioms" and ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ the rest of the theory deduced as postulates.

In this way

But this ~~ix~~ description may not be terribly elegant nor terribly precise, and so we may be led to attempt a further step-- choosing ~~xxxx~~ certain characteristics as definitional, as being critical, fundamental, basic, perhaps necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the word "camel" to a thing. The biologists seem to have done just this, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ in fact; a dictionary is likely to tell us, ^{just by emphasis} that its ~~family~~ hereditary family is ~~the~~ what makes a camel a camel, and even Antarctic camels with ~~white~~ black hair and long beards would still be camels if we could prove their descent.

....

If you like circles and dots, as I do,.... "the circles that seem to have the most generality" are the useful ones. In other words, all objects that _____ seem also to have _____. We have now one circle full of dots and two descriptions of it. Which is "defining"? Why that one which fits in with the most other things.

.....

We would really have no use at all for $\frac{(\bar{x} - x_i)^2}{n}$ were it not for the statistical properties which this number has.

....

But this in description may not be terribly elegant nor terribly precise, and so we may be led to attempt a further step -- choosing terms certain characteristics as definitive, as being essential, basic, perhaps necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the word "camel" to a thing. The difficulty was to have just this, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ in fact; a difficulty just by emphasis is likely to tell us that the xxxxxx xxxxxx is the what makes a camel a camel, and even automatic answers with white black hair and long humps would still be camels if we could prove their descent.

.....

If you like circles and lots, as I do,.... the circles that seem to have the most "generality" are the useful ones. In other words, all objects that seem also to have we have now one circle full of lots and two descriptions of it. Which is "telling"? Why that one which fits in with the rest of other things.

.....

We would really have to use at all for $(x - x_0)^2$ were it

not for the statistical properties which this number has.

.....

We will choose some things as "defining" for their elegance and basicness; if they are simpler, or have been important and are hence more general, we may want to make them defining.

....

... #CORRESPONDING EXTENSIONALLY TO
 ANOTHER CATEGORY, ~~THAT~~ WH/CH...'
 (Give example, for Gossake.)

We will choose some things as "defining" for their
significance and importance; if they are simpler, or have been
important and are hence more general, we may want to make them
belong.

... EXERCISES ...
... THEORY ...
(give example for exercise.)

(INSERT IN OP RST I)

Of course
If the alternatives have been really
arranged according to some
principle, then searching for a
principle becomes a guessing
game, like science itself. Unless
we want a simpler recognition-principle.

THAT'S WHAT
OP. RESEARCH IS — (finds "examples")
the special
case which
~~BUT IT~~ INVOLVES
QUESTIONS & SUMMARIES OF PORTION'S
~~THOUGHT~~.

(insert in 42940 I)

Of course the alternatives have been really
arranged according to some
principles then ~~some~~ ~~other~~
principles become a process
game, like science itself. We
are want a simpler recognition device.

After 2nd
of 12th 17
of 12th 17
of 12th 17
of 12th 17
of 12th 17

In the sense that it is still
difficult I think the mind-body
problem is ~~still~~ ^{as} I found it.

~~but in my own thinking it is now~~

The Richard 'we-don't-need-minds' behaviorist
can still make a ~~good~~ court case
and a party splash. But insofar as
we do ^{assume} calculate as though other people
had minds ~~and feelings~~ ^{and feelings} of great complexity, and

~~really thought that felt that~~

~~over~~ These calculations

are ^{pragmatically} borne out in splendid detail throughout
every moment of our lives such a viewpoint
seems to a sophisticated social science ~~more of a stunt than~~ ^{less sure} ^{than a stunt}

[Essay the first.]

ON MAKING A LIST OF THE THINGS YOU WANT.

Suppose you are a brain-trust organization seeking to inform the government of the relative preferability of different outcomes of an atomic war; an old cook telling the new one what the fickle family/likes; a Committee for National Goals, ~~unwittingly~~ ^{for which they work} ~~pointing the way for~~ ^{deciding} what the country should ~~achieve~~ ^{attempt} in the future.

In each of these cases, you ~~will~~ ^{might} be doing something roughly like this: you will be seeking general principles to describe an ordering of alternatives, some of which are desired or enjoyed or feared more; some, less.

These cases differ from the stock economic situation in that there is no common currency for which they can all be bought; ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ we are not allocating resources or deciding to switch one alternative for another. These possible trades are the subject of price theory,

~~xxxxxx~~ ^{Rather} ~~xxxxxx~~ usually and/involve exchange values-- either ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ supplied by the individual, in which case the ordering we discuss would be a possible first step, or external, which is ~~xxxxxxx~~ general economics.

~~Internal prices as well as external preference-rates~~

~~Can go either direction~~

~~In this ordering process, one may proceed in two directions;~~

[Examine the first.]

In these cases, one seeks principles

~~or both; that is, one may seek principles according to~~

~~which~~ that summarize or digest an ordering of possible

events or world-states that is already clear to ~~whom~~

Another process of interest is its opposite, applying
~~him, or he may apply principles to cases to find out what~~

particular order of ~~world~~ things corresponds to a ~~principle~~

There is an interesting logical relation between these.
~~set of principles already in mind. The former might~~

be called ~~extensional~~

an extensional method (from extension to ^{intension,} ~~intention~~) the
 child
 going by precedent. (A ~~man~~/notes that he likes pistachio

and lime-flavored things better than chocolate or strawberry,

hence concludes he likes green things better than red or

brown things.) The latter method might be called "intensional," ^(or, casuistical,)

proceeding from principles to cases ("I'm sure I don't

like foreign things; therefore I won't like candied chestnuts.")

~~Obviously in our everyday activities~~

Usually in such preference-orderings proceed in both
 directions, and there can be many reasons for it. The evolution
 of common-law ~~rights~~ is perhaps ~~one of the most interesting~~
 the best example: a judicial decision is repeated because
 it seems to be like another, ~~and~~ there is no pressing difference;
 a general principle is gradually hammered out.

It may be observed that in our everyday evaluations we usually proceed in both directions. In choosing what ~~xxxx~~ photographs they will use in a picture-story, magazine-editors may look at the pictures first, then devise principles ~~of organization~~ which lead them to prefer one photograph over another ("Let's ~~xxx~~ give it the glamour slant-- that means the fur-rug shot is better than the one where she's typing...") -- however, looking at certain other photographs may alter the principles ("Say, let's make it glamour-with-intellect.")

A slightly different case is that in which the ordering of cases on which the principles are based is altered by the intensionalization (perhaps because such an intensionalization is simpler or easier to administer.) For instance: "Always ~~buy the darker firm ones~~ buy the darker firm ones, and if you can't get big ones get little, don't buy the in-between ... actually there are exceptions but this rule is a good guide."

~~These principles~~ Ordering principles which are intensionalized preference- from a given/order of things are ~~interestingly~~ subject to difficulties of "validity." Like psychological tests, they may be ~~xxxxxxx~~ ranking the things in a way that holds for other the cases given but not for/possible ones. (For instance, advertising writers output ranking ~~professionally publication~~ rather than standing in the profession. Our little boy who prefers to eat

green things, for instance, might find on discovering Paris green that ~~the~~ ^{his attempted} intensionalization of the preferences he has is

unsatisfactory. (Some people always like Chinese food better than French food. For others of us this is not a field in which easy intensionalization is to be accomplished.)

Another

INSERT 'George'

Another aspect would be

~~While it may not set up more complex relationships, like preference-ratios, among the things preferred,~~ intensionalization may break down or set up equalities. That ~~it~~ is, it may give you a decision-procedure for ^{choosing} ~~deciding~~ between alternatives on which you might otherwise have been indifferent. Contrarily, it may ~~it~~ state certain things to be of equal value-- two people's lives in a disaster, ~~two units of happiness~~ two units of happiness (in some Utilitarian schemes.) we may derive Frequently/more complex relationships-- ratio valuations, for instance, may come about. ~~For example, we will~~ ^{might} call a disaster killing twenty people "twice as bad" as one killing ten-- assuming none are heads of state, etc.

In Operations Research or Applied Game Theory we may seek to find the value (in other units, perhaps; i.e., ratio-value) ~~of the loss of a million people in the next war, or a rook on your chessboard.~~ ^{an experienced} Tabulating on a profit-and-loss sheet, we may state that ~~a machine-operator~~ machine-operator is worth fifty thousand dollars to the company." However, these are not strictly intensionalization-~~problems~~ problems. They are related to other, ~~goals~~ further goals-- national survival, the outcome of the chess-game, corporation profit. They are

■ attempts at simplification of the complex-- as, for instance, the value of your rook depends on what else is on the board, what situation you're in, and your style of play. Because projections of this kind leave a great deal out, their accuracy is fickle.* ~~(While no one charts~~

~~flight plans for butterflies, these~~
 FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE
 Of course, these examples may still partake of the

principle of intensionalization: if ~~xxx~~ the evaluators, by eye or skill, ~~xxxcomputerx~~ make ^a ~~xxxx~~/rankings of possible situations, and a principle is sought which will describe this well, -- for instance, a simple operating rule. However, insofar as ~~they~~ are involved with these examples theoretical considerations-- the real problems of the field-- it is something else again. (If they cheat and use a computer, that shows they probably know ~~xxx~~ something about the principles already.)

FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE FOOTNOTE

~~I have come now to the problem of a stumbling block of Utilitarianism.~~

Presumably these considerations offer a stumbling-block for Utilitarianism, or any ethical system~~x~~ that speaks of quantities of things being better than other quantities of things-- for instance, that ^{for there to be} twenty units of pleasure is better than for there to be nineteen. It is hardly to be doubted

virtually
 that/everyone's list of preferences things higher of a world
 in which everyone is happy than a world in which most people
 are ~~happy~~ unhappy, other things being equal. (For those
 who regard art, knowledge, understanding of the neurotic
 process, etc., as sometimes more important than happiness
~~when we can have it when we can have it when we can have it~~
 the list~~s~~ of possible worlds can be ~~slightly rearranged~~
 re-ordered.) However, it is not clear that just because
 our list of preferred worlds reads thus-and-so, we can
 write ~~any~~ any decisive principle at all that successfully
 intensionalizes our beliefs completely; and it is my impression
 that that is one thing ~~that~~ an Utilitarian ethic would seek
 to do.

I have need to provide a reasonable account of things I have at hand explained satisfactorily:

DESCRIBING IN TERMS OF AFFECT WITHOUT INTELLIGENTIALIZATION & SITUATION IS LIKE A STOVE WITH NO FOOD AND NO POT.

1) The ~~growth~~ of rationality, belligerence and threat

3) Prejudice

a) The circumstances under which pacifism will work (cultural impression)
2) how explanation and sensitivity among people may ~~exacerbate~~ improve relations.

Of course it behooves us to know why someone did the v.

Hold OUT

of SP ~~the~~
'George'

~~The~~ ~~principles~~ you are after may be in search

You may want to do the ~~the~~ best Thing,
or you may want to understand why a Thing
is best. In either case you ~~may be~~
are searching for ~~the~~ general principles
~~behind the orderings~~

of the ranking. ~~but~~ However, operating
rules and knowledge are different.

There may be a fantastically simple principle
you can assign to this ordering
(the tallest men on my list make the
most money ⁴⁰) ~~or~~ ~~while~~ ~~There is~~
while the causes are extremely complex
or chaotic, i.e., there is no general principle.

Conversely, it may be easy to understand
why a thing on our betterness-list
is where it is, but ~~so~~ There may be
no way of ~~it~~ recognizing it. It is
~~merely~~ a question of whether ~~there are~~
there exist surface indicators for this ordering principle.
OVER

~~the indicators~~

Of course, in many

there are many indicators and principles

of the work is to know how to do it. You want to do it right. You want to do it well. You want to do it fast. You want to do it cheap. You want to do it with the least effort. You want to do it with the least resources. You want to do it with the least time. You want to do it with the least money. You want to do it with the least trouble. You want to do it with the least risk. You want to do it with the least uncertainty. You want to do it with the least conflict. You want to do it with the least resistance. You want to do it with the least opposition. You want to do it with the least opposition.

I have tried to trim this down to a few examples of what I had in mind. "The" theory of rationality will have to wait on ~~it~~ ~~little~~ more care and more distinctions. But I do mean to get at a few things which I think the social-psychologists often misrepresent, i.e., ~~these distinctions like aggression & prejudice which are supposed usually to be affect-led.~~ ~~But I will talk here about:~~

~~A restatement of~~

- 1) Rules — a person's or an organization's — that divide up a lot of instances into categories.
- A) the effects of the rules
 - B) the hierarchy " " "

2) Set-theory & the finding of

a proper in temporal statement

3) Goals [silly "definitional" mess of goals $\longleftrightarrow$ rules]

Huge Difficulties of utilitarian accounting

A) INTENSIONAL ordering of a large number of alternative universes

⊙ ~~THE~~ ALWAYS THE PROBLEM OF, ~~THE~~ DESPITE THE INTENSION WE'VE FOUND, MAY THERE NOT BE A POSSIBLE UNIVERSE VERY MUCH AWAY FROM WHERE IT SHOULD BE RANKED?

clear that if they are advanced as straight dispositional or tendency-statements or conditional-statements, they may be susceptible to confirmation -- at any rate, the dispositional or conditional or tendency-component of the statement may be confirmed. Thus, on the S-R view, the phenomenological component of the statements is "surplus meaning," systematically unconfirmable; yet this is the component I have been talking about.

Yet it is hard to see that the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ question "do you get the joke?" can fail to have a phenomenological component of which the external manifestations are actions like laughing, knee-slapping, rolling on the floor.

On the S-R view, one talks about the perceived stimulus as being really there (i.e., a red disk at the end of a maze) but not when we are talking about the perceived mental-states of others. This would seem puzzling when we are correct. If a subject says, "I see a mountain," on seeing a stereopticon slide, we judge that his statement is true if he says it when looking toward a mountain we know to be there. Same with statements about people's internal states: they may have action results in the indefinite future, but this is not their meaning.

And part of the puzzle is that they have no

PSYCHIC FEEDBACK.

I want to discuss some problems which tend to become obscured; those aspects of human behavior which involve ~~predicting what the other~~ judging what another person is thinking, or predicting what he will do. The name I propose is "psychic feedback;" I do not ever intend to broach this term in the literature, but

~~The reason I go out of the way to point this up as un-~~

This is importantly unusual subject-matter; and while I do not mean to be immodest, bears about the same relation to what can be described in simple S-R terms that the integers do to $\sqrt{-1}$. In other words, something more is required here.

- I. WE JUDGE OTHER PEOPLE, IN MANY WAYS. These are subject to the criteria of truth and falsity.
1. In the first place, I think it will be agreed that straight predictions of others' actions are obviously either true or false; that is, either they are confirmed or disconfirmed when the time comes.
2. Statements about 'state of mind' are less obviously amenable to the criteria of truth and falsity. It is

And the same is true with statements like "He is happy" and "he is in love." While each of these suggests a good deal in the way of possible actions by him, none may correctly be said to be a necessary component of the meaning; though he would really be a case if these held for him no behavioral entailments.

A clue is the notion of latent muscular & neural patterns which might (under the right circumstances) become action but this is not phenomenology. Fug.

This is partly the summary-puzzle. ~~People's~~ If people's thoughts are ~~thoughts being as~~ complex as laymen usually suppose them to be, there are many different sets of ~~xxxx~~ statements which would be correctly summarized as "he is ~~xxxxhappyxx~~ in love," many of which may be contradicted in other ^{such} sets.

This is related to "multiple satisfiability," the property that a lot of different world-states will ~~xxxx~~ satisfy the same general statements.

So much, for now, for predictions and state-of-mind statements. Now to a third category, ~~xxxxx~~ of what I believe is great importance: subtle-judgements. These are the kind of judgements~~x~~ which are neither predictions nor phenomenological statements, but partake of both. These are indeed multiply satisfiable; the statement, for instance, "George is ~~an~~ grouchy person" suggests that George will behave in unpleasant ways toward people, but does not imply it; it may also be a statement about George's st. mind.

These three categories were mentioned just to impress you with the range of possible judgements of people which may be made; and with the fact that, while their truth or falsity is no simple matter, ~~it~~they can be known to be true or false in some cases.


The next topic is psychic feedback proper. And it deals with actions which involve ~~pr~~ a prediction of what other people will do or think on the basis of our own actions.

Straight predictive feedback involves merely others' ^{like a chess-game;} actions which will be based on ours; psychic feedback is that which involves their states of mind. And I think it must be conceded

(WHY?)

that it takes place.

There are times when we base our actions not on what other people may do, but on what they merely think; while all the while these thoughts might cause them to act, (and if we are worried about the thoughts it ~~ixxx~~ may well be a. that actions have



BEHAVIOR-CATEGORIES

"Legitimacy-complex"

Status
Obligation
Law & Rule
Sanctions

RESPONSIBILITY / "DESERVE"

VIRTUE / HONOR / PRUDENCE / PROFLIGACY

Conduct becoming a _____

RESPONSIBILITY / FREE WILL / INITIATIVE / NEGLIGENCE

FAIR / UNFAIR

KIND / OVERGENEROUS

BAD OR GOOD LUCK

- a) that for which no recompense is provided
~~xx~~ ALSO -- a loss which might well not have taken place
xx
- b) accidental windfall which won't be taken away; ~~xx~~
'legitimate' but not 'deserved'.

[S] [E]

- a) challenge/threat → consolidation
- b) gifts, thanks, apologies ^{favours} → filling categories + giving impressions
- c) scheduled reprisals
- d) scheduled gifts; got/etch.
- e) AS THESE GIVE IMPRESSIONS OF INNER STATES OF MIND AND PROPENSITIES; the multi-feedback judging of them on this basis.
- f) drawing the line
→ CONVINCING OF OUR SINCERITY


4. 'Cultural' transmission of a value-system.

- extensional
 # individual squares it himself
- intensional
 # " applies " "
- both; mixture.

REGARDLESS OF HOW CAREFULLY HE MAY BE TAUGHT, OUTSIDE INFLUENCES OR OWN THOUGHTS MAY JAR THE FRAMEWORK. FOR A SYSTEM TO BE TRANSMITTED INTACT, THEN, WE MAY PRESUME THAT SOME COMMUNITY OF UNANIMITY IS DESIRABLE.

5. ~~Three~~ interesting fields of human categorization.

- A. The complexes of initiative, responsibility, volition, determination.
- B. The judging of things like 'eligible,' 'suitable,' ^{or anything} by criteria.
 - a) as invested rules
 - ~~b) as personality traits~~
 - b) as personal rules (highly-structured individual)
 - c) ~~as~~ without rules (totally non-structured [mythical] ind.)
- C. The 'Hone' model.



1

Intensionality & Extensionality.

1. Their relation: rules & instances.
 - A. Decision-procedure
 - B. Lines of least resistance.
2. How an individual may acquire a role-system -
(Starting with either.)
3. 'Purposes' of rules.

1. ~~General~~ Effect.

A. general

B. specific — laws to prevent.

- ANOTHER 'PURPOSE' WHICH MUST EXIST IN THE LONG RUN IF WE MEDITATE.
2. Squaring with a system: ^{post facto laws} hierarchy; spheres of influence; contradictions & their resolution, either by ~~squaring the~~ re-cutting spheres of influence, reinterpreting, or throwing out the contradictory one.

The nature of a test case:

To clarify the borderlines — but may upset everything, break an equilibrium, change whole setup.

DERIVED CATEGORIES AND BEHAVIOR.

- People's actions may be oriented in terms of derived categories.
- There exists a number of categories, derivationally related, which are culturally universal.
- An individual some of whose behavior is oriented to such categories may put the emphasis on one or the other of such categories, and/or the boundaries among them, or certain of these boundaries;
AND BEHAVE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO WHAT HE EMPHASIZES.
- BOUNDARIES AMONG THEM may be the more or less
 - A) logically explicit (defined in terms of the other categories' differentia ~~xxx~~ plus logical terms,) B) intricate, careful (re the things which are in and out-- extensional definition,) C) coherent in a world-view, some or all of whose parts fit together carefully.
- ~~AN~~ individual may proceed in his formulation either extensionally or syntactically -- in the first case from a set of examples ~~where~~ ~~xxxxxxx~~ known to be in a certain set of categories, in the latter according to the relations he ~~knows~~ believes are important among them-- and formulating a more precise world-view in either way.
N.B. we all do both.

PHILOSOPHY OF PRICING

One thought on the ascription of equal value to equal units.

Send this to Scriv
Beard
Pierson

In a money economy, everything has a value, so it would seem superfluous to go around figuring how we put values on things

.....
certain equality principles, for expectancy and fairness, plus implicit decision to abide by market...

.....
We have swung a long circle, ending at money, but cutting our meat from easier examples of moral and game theory...

The following is really four or five different things.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCOUNTING -- another aspect.

Suppose you have a single continuum of goodness.

STILL* you must put in other continua of more proximate goodness, since the single scale may not be more readily attainable, and other intermediate scales must be put in.

/ Sort of 'working rules' whereby you expect the one
/ type of thing to be better to do for your final-good
/ continua.

ANYHOW plotting all things onto a single rating is spurious (sic) since it omits conditionalities.

PLOTTING CONDITIONAL RATINGS ONTO A SINGLE ONE IS TREACHEROUS.

They might change in their utilities, payoffs, etc.

The importance of this fact varies with a lot of things.

*Except for pursuit-curve, 'next-moment-from-previous' situations.

Plotting payoffs on a single scale-- worse or better depending on how ~~x~~ conditional the sub-payoffs are for your final goodness -- is very like finding appropriate variables for summary description. How conditional are they? The more so, the less will their single scale tell you.

Answer

Any

Only argument that each unit of good is of equal utility is either
 a) the averaging process we have just (?) described, or b) according
 to some production-possibility curve, in which case it's the same
 but to justify the outcome as equivalent.

My analysis of that pricing-problem

Holds for 'pleasure' & 'American cities destroyed,' but not for

individuals-- because of categoricity owing to attitude problem.

(HUMS)

the attitude-problem makes calculations impossible.

Whether two continua may be plotted onto one depends on how conditional
 they are; or how conditional you will 'allow' them to be.

People have sort of rules they go by about their utilities, but (thank
 goodness for their sakes) these are frequently modified ad hoc.

In other words, their own general formulations of what they want may be
 good statements of roughly what to be after in the general run of
 situations (or 'the way it looks from here,') but these rules aren't
 as general as they might think: I.E. UTILITY-FUNCTION (real) much more
 COMPLICATED.

Continua of payoff vs. conditional payoff.

EXAMPLE.

Choice of colleges: 'academic goodness' -- 'general' vs. 'by departments'
 or by 'individual man.'

CONVERTING THE PRINCIPLES HOWBY WE WILL SQUARE THE SET OF PAYOFFS.

Let us say that there is a limited number of criteria-- for example,
 two-- of which our payoff-number (assigned directly, by formula)
 is a function.

ANY decision-procedure (in the case of equal-pairs, for deciding which
 is better) and any conditionals-- 'outside,' i.e., irrelevant to
 the criteria we have set or in some way circumstantial to them-- or
 inside criteria, some other measurable attribute-- must also be
 counted as really being another criterion.

WAIT A MINUTE-- a chance decision-procedure is not a criterion; rather,
 it's a mechanism. And arbitrary, impulsive decisions can't be called
 criterial either. PERHAPS THESE REALLY CONFORM TO REGULARITIES AND
 ARE THUS CRITERIA, BUT that's rather like introducing some very
 complicated formula where it doesn't have to be explicitly stated;
 explaining somebody's lateness in terms of a subway-router's indi-
 gestion.

SCHEDULING PAYOFFS IN A SERIAL ORDER is like/relates to scheduling

Payoff-listing is different from pricing.

NELSON'S CONJECTURE.

Principles of payoff ranking apply to the goodness of barter & & economic systems only as far as the alternative systems (in their totality) are concerned-- i.e., ranking of all the goodies in the society, inc. especially 'rule' ones-- equity, hierarchy stuff.

'Another day, another dollar.' But we might earn that dollar the last minute, or the first. But these are all 'unreal allocations'-- with imaginative value and not much more.

To put it much better: trying to put too fine a point on 'paper allocations' (day : dollar) shows a misunderstanding of the terms if it is not familiar with the way the allocation is made: the dollar is not given for the last minute's work on condition that the preceding part of the day be worked also; while this is indistinguishable from 'dollar is for the whole day' operationally, under certain circumstances we might be able to find out which the principle is. Lacking these circumstances, it seems at the very least metaphorical to suppose the dollar is for the last minute's work.

ANYHOW

THE GENERAL

OVERWEENING

OVERRIDING PRINCIPLE. ~~establishing a ranking~~

There are two ways of ~~getting~~ of values along a continuum.

EXTENSIONAL-- order the possible universes on a scale of their goodness to you; then choose/among the possible/reasonable principles ~~xx~~ if you wish

that will yield this ranking. N.B.: 1) there may be a number of possible sets of principles for you to choose among; 2) you may be unable to find a consistent set.

INTENSIONAL-- starting with the rules and projecting them onto the field,


Small bollix: the differences of individual judgement ~~xxxx~~ may crop up in either case. In the extensional, even people who generally agree on things may disagree on precise order despite broad similarities of outlook. In the intensional, ~~x~~people may disagree on the application of the rules (subject, then, to all the 'schematics' complaints,) ~~xxxx~~ or they may through myopia etc. merely misjudge upon scales where there exists basic agreement.

caused our ~~a~~ worry about thoughts, b. that actions may justify our fear of the ghts.)

But it may be only thoughts, conceptually, what we fear-- ~~x~~ inferred hypothetical constructs that they may be-- and not the ancillary action-potential. Let it be noted ~~if~~ that if our judgements of ~~the~~ others' thoughts is true, well then.

Is the statement more than a summary/^{of} a disjunction of a complex action-potential statement?

~~xxxxxxx~~ I certainly think so; yet I am at a loss to prove it.



WILL

→ & All the problems of
EXPECTATION
DECLARATION, COMMITMENT

Psychic
Feedback

4/14/4
L. J. Beck

AP
TION
TION, COMMITMENT

CHICAGO WRITINGS, Winter Quarter '60

~~and~~
OPRS, ART FRAGMENTS

FLOORED

24
(34)

